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THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT IN THE
STATE COURTS
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT1 [ICA] confers concurrent juris-
diction upon state and federal courts to enforce its provisions.2 During
twenty-one years of exclusively federal attention,- some federal courts
have recognized private rights of action in addition to the regulatory
provisions of the act.4 Two recent decisions of the Delaware Court of
Chancery are the advance guard of a large number of cases in which
plaintiffs are asserting such private rights of action in state courts.5  In
Lutz v. Boas" and Saminsky v. Abbott,7 the Delaware court granted
relief alternatively under its own common law, or the ICA, as that act
has been construed by some federal courts.
Two decades of federal litigation have left unsettled the exact
theory by which these private rights of action are granted under the
ICA.' Thus state courts soon will face not only the problems of con-
54. Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § goa (x958).
254 Stat. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-43 (1958). See note 20 infra for text of
this section.
" This statement is based on a search of the fifty state Shepard's Citators from the
date of passage of the ICA through the advance sheets current in late x962. The dearth
of state court cases apparently reflects both the previous lack of interest in the act, and
a desire on the part of plaintiffs to take advantage of more favorable precedents in the
federal courts.
' The ICA primarily consists of regulatory provisions, the only exception being
§ 3 o(f). See note 34 infra.
"Approximately sixty derivative suits were pending in early x961. May, Observa-
lions, 193 THE COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 968 (x961). Most of these
were in the federal courts. It is particularly significant that the Delaware Court of
Chancery now recognizes these causes of action, for it has long been a great maker of
corporation law. Delaware is also the corporate "home" of many investment companies,
making them more amenable to suit in that state.
a 171 A.zd 381 (Del. Ch.), hearing on subsequent developments, 176 A.2d 853 (Del.
Ch. 596i).
7 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,047 (Del. Ch. Sept. IS, ig6t).
'The uncertainty is exemplified in the opposite holdings in Brouk v. Managed
Funds, Inc., a86 F.2d 9o (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 95g8, Motion of Solicitor
General for leave to participate in oral argument granted, 368 U.S. 873 (x961), where
the existence of private rights of action beyond those expressly included in the statute
was denied and in Brown v. Bullock, x94 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294. F.zd
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
current division of state and federal jurisdiction created by the ICA,
but also the act's effect upon the private litigant.
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY
Although investment companies were in existence before the turn
of the century, they have risen to major economic importance in the
United States only in the last two or three decades.9 In the last twenty
years their total assets have multiplied nine and one-half times, and
some authorities predict that an industry comparable in magnitude to
insurance is now in its formative years.10
In the usual industry context, an investment company is one comer
of a triangle composed of the investment company, the investment
adviser, and the underwriting organization. The investment adviser fur-
nishes securities research and analysis services to the investment com-
pany and often specific advice on when to buy and sell given securities.
The working relationship of these two entities is governed by the
advisory contract.11 The underwriting organization, with its sales and
promotional force, undertakes to distribute investment company shares
to the public. The underwriter and the dealers through whom it often
operates are compensated by a fraction of the sales load, i.e., a markup
over the net asset value of the shares. There are several types of
investment companies, the most significant being the management com-
4.15 (zd Cir. x96z), where such rights were recognized. This conflict is discussed in
Comment, 1961 DuKE L.J. 421.
* There have been two periods of growth of investment companies; one before the
1929 market decline and the present period, which began in the mid-x94o's and showed
its greatest strength before 195o. i Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 144-47 (zd ed.
i961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]I PLUM & HUMPHREY, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND
MANAGEMENT 569-76 (1955).
10 26 SEC ANN. REP. 169 (196o). One authority, Arthur Wiesenburger & Co.,
predicts that the investment company industry will have assets exceeding zoo billion
dollars by igo. This figure is based on an extension into the next two decades of
one-half of the growth rate of investment companies between x955 and 196o. In
evaluating this prediction, it should be remembered that during the past five years, we
have been caught up in a "bull" market, that is a rising market, replete with investor
courage. Investment companies thrive on a rising market for at least two reasons:
(i) investor confidence, resulting in larger sales of investment contracts, and (a) appre.
ciation of the common stock held by the companies. Notwithstanding these mitigating
considerations and in the absence of a major business failure, it is fairly certain that
investment companies will occupy an increasingly important role in the American eco.
nomic picture in the years ahead. ALTHux WIESENBEIEl & Co., INVESTMENT COM-
PANIES 9 (i96o ed.)
"
1 The advisory contract is now governed by § x5 of the ICA, 5 Stat. SIX (1940),
15 U.S.C. § Soa-Is (195).
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pany,12 a company controlled by a board of directors having broad,
discretionary powers extending beyond those of a mere custodian or
trustee.
Federal regulation, originating in the enactment of 940, was predi-
cated on major abuse in the industry.13 Testimony before congres-
sional committees during hearings on the proposed ICA revealed that
investment companies were often used by management for purposes
which were not in the best interests of shareholders.Y Officers and
managers sometimes bought securities from controlled investment com-
panies at a discount from the market price or sold securities to them at
unfair prices.' 5 In at least a few of the broker-controlled companies,
management was not above "churning" the portfolio.1 6
After investors had purchased shares in investment companies on
is 16 SEC ANN. REP. 169 (196o). See also 54 Stat. 799 (1940), is U.S.C. § Soa-+
(1958) (classification of investment companies) ; 54 Stat. goo (x94o), i5 U.S.C. § Soa-
5 (1958) (subclassification of management companies).
2sCf. SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES Pt. II,
at 504, 505 (1939) (Table 155 and Chart 48).
1, "The outstanding features of the management policies of many investment com-
panies reveal a consistent relationship to the private business interests of the sponsor.
Investment companies sponsored by brokers frequently show active trading in portfolio
securities; companies sponsored by investment bankers show portfolios heavily weighted
with security issues underwritten by the sponsors and a large proportion of under-
writings shared with sponsors; companies sponsored by industrial promoters show port-
folios favoring large blocks of securities-available as instrumentalities of control-
in various industrial enterprises in which the sponsors were interested." SEC, REPORT
ON INVESTMENT TRusTs AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES pt. III, at 2486-87 (194).
15 See SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES pt. II,
at 22 (1940) and pt. III, at 2635 (194-).
1" "Churning" denotes the rapid buying and selling of securities to generate addi-
tional brokerage fees rather than to gain an advantage in the market for the investor.
This abuse was often found in broker-controlled companies. Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d
381 (Del. Ch. 1961), illustrates another context in which "churning" may be found.
The sale of investment contracts is facilitated by an attractive earnings record. Invest-
ment company earnings are produced in large measure by realized capital gains. Thus
the choice between selling for an immediate declarable gain and holding for a more
prudent (in the terms of long range gain) selling opportunity can be influenced by the
desire of the underwriter to "declare dividends." In the Lutz case, the Slayton brothers,
dominating the investment company, the investment company adviser and the under-
writer, harnessed the policies of the investment company to the needs of the underwriter
and "churning" resulted.
Besides the additional profits for the underwriter, there was another reason for the
"churning" license extended to the broker in the Lutz case, namely the kickbacks from
the broker to the investment adviser. These kickbacks took the form of free investment
advice and hiring the Slayton's relatives for "paper jobs" in Miami Beach. Eventually
the broker assumed the function of the investment adviser, leaving it with a sizeable
fee from the investment company--but no work load. ,
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the basis of the reputation and standing of the then-existing investment
adviser, the investment advisory contract or control of the investment
adviser was sometimes purchased by a group which had different poli-
des or which was incompetent or dishonest. Control of the investment
company itself was occasionally "sold" to unreliable persons who looted
the highly liquid corporate assets.17
Boards of directors of some management companies took advantage
of their broad power and altered the basic investment policy of their
companies, to the serious prejudice of non-consenting shareholders.18
Often the board of directors retained its power through inequitable
stock structures and by pyramiding one investment company on
another."
It is against this background of abuse that private rights of action,
similar to those which first found expression in the federal courts, are
being brought in the state courts. As these actions are brought, it
will be necessary for state courts to inquire into their duty to accept
jurisdiction and into the theories by which these rights are established.
THE DuTY oF STATE CouRTs TO ENFORCE THE ICA
State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce
' Even during the period of the great market decline, when investment securities
were selling at discounts from their asset value, "many individuals . . . , alert to the
possibilities of profit from the control of such funds, were willing to pay sums sub.
stantially in excess of asset and market values to existing controlling interests for their
holdings in companies to be acquired." SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND
INVESTMENT COMPANIES pt. III, at 23 & n.z85 (1940).
For an analysis of sale-of-control problems, especially in investment companies,
see generally Comment, Sales of Corporate Control at a Premium, z96x DUKE L.J. 554.
A distinction has recently been drawn between the sale of "control" and the sale of
a controlling block of securities of the investment company. See Willheim v. Murchison,
30 U.S.L. WEEK 2483 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, x967.) ; cf., SEC v. Insurance Sec., Inc.,
254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (z958), afirming, 146 F. Supp.
778 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
"' The investment policy of an investment company is important to the shareholder,
because, in the typical case, he is looking for a particular type of risk. Some investors
prefer high risk securities with growth potential while others prefer more stable invest-
ments. Since the investment company shareholder ordinarily incurs a "sales load" of
some eight per cent when he buys his shares, ARTHUR WIESENBERGCER & Co., op. cit.
supra note 1o, at 234, he cannot, without substantial penalty, protect himself by trading
out of a company whose policy has changed. Therefore it is in the interest of investors
for these companies to announce and adhere to a fixed policy. This problem is now
covered by § 13 of the ICA. 54 Stat. 811 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-13 (1958).
1
'These problems are treated in 54. Stat. 817 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-18 (1958)
(prohibitions against inequitable capital structure), 4 Stat. 8±6 (1940), s5 U.S.C.
§ 8oa-25 (1958) (reorganization plans).
(VOL.2962:423
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
rights and duties arising under the Investment Company Act.20 Upon
its face, the section of the ICA which bestows this jurisdiction upon the
state courts is permissive rather than obligatory. In this respect it
closely parallels the language of the Federal Employers Liability Act
[FELA] 21 Since there have been no decisions under the ICA de-
fining more precisely the effect of its jurisdictional section upon the
state courts 2 2 it is helpful to examine the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the similar language of the FELA.
In Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.., the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut had affirmed the dismissal of a complaint under
the FELA on the ground that state courts need not enforce a federal
statute.24 In reversing, the Supreme Court of the United States said
that to the extent that a particular state trial court has inherent juris-
dictional capacity adequate to entertain a suit of the type brought under
the FELA, it must take jurisdiction of the federally created action, even
if the suit is brought by a non-resident plaintiff against a non-resident
defendant for a cause of action arising outside the forum state.25
Later decisions have mitigated the sweeping Mondou rule and in-
deed have become more important than the original decision. One of
the most important of these modifications was made in Douglas v. New
So "The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have juris-
diction of violations of this title or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, and,
concurrently with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation of, this
title or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder." 54 Stat. 844 (1940), 75 U.S.C.
§ 8oa-43 (1958). Four of the other five federal securities acts have substantially the
same wording. The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 86, 15 U.S.C. § 77(v); the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, S3 Stat. 1175, 15 U.S.C. § 77(vvv) (z958) i the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 835, 15 U.S.C. § 79(Y) (i958); the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 194o, 54 Stat. 856, i5 U.S.C. § 8ob-q4, (i9Sg).
2 "The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be
concurrent with that of the courts of the several States." 35 Stat. 66 (191o), as
amended 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958). The question has also arisen in other contexts. See,
e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); 2 Loss 978 n.461.
"a This statement is made on the basis of a reading of every case cited by the fifty
state Shepard's Citators as having cited the ICA through the advance sheets of late 196z.
See note 3 supra.
"223 U.S. I (1912).
" Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 8z Conn. 373, 73 Atl. 762 (19o9).
23 23 U.S. at 59. Referring to the two court systems, state and federal, the Court
remarked: "The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the
law of the land for the State .... " Id. at 58.
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York, N I.H. & H.R.R.21 There the Supreme Court was confronted with
a New York statute providing that "[A]n action against a foreign
corporation may be maintained by a non-resident only when the foreign
corporation is doing business within the state."27 New York had always
permitted residents of the state to bring suit against foreign corpora-
tions for foreign torts, but where the plaintiff was a non-resident, the
trial courts had construed the statute as granting them discretion to
allow or refuse the action,28 even if that action were one to enforce a
federally created right. This distinction between residents and non-
residents was predicated on the "may" in the statute and applied even
when the non-resident was in fact a citizen of New York. The Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, upheld this discretionary
exclusion of non-resident plaintiffs as a valid ground on which to give
the state taxpayers, who supported the state court system, a preference
in overcrowded tribunals.29
The basic philosophy of the Douglas case was that states could
regulate the use of their own court systems in a reasonable manner,
even where a federal right was being asserted. In keeping with the
doctrine of reasonable regulation, it has been settled that plaintiffs with
federal rights in state courts may be barred by reasonable state juris-
:6 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
7'At that time, N.Y. CoNs. LAws ch. 24, § 47 (Cahill 1923). (Emphasis added.)2 This practice was approved in Murnan v. Wabash Ry., 246 N.Y. 244, x58 N.E.
508 (1927).
29 Holmes said that the statute did not require state enforcement but only empow'ered
it. 279 U.S. at 387. (Emphasis added.) He went on to qualify this apparent reversal
of the philosophy of the Mondou case by stating that there is no state duty of enforce-
ment "as against an otherwise valid excuse." 279 U.S. at 388. Set in the context of
the whole opinion, the latter phrase is more representative of the holding of the case.
The Douglas modification of the Mondou rule was apparently impelled by a forum
shopping problem. The Minnesota courts, for example, were overrun with suits be-
tween non-residents. This is reflected in the concurring opinion of Justice Stone in
Winders v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 177 Minn. 1, 5, 223 N.W. 291, 293 (5929), where le
complains of the expense to which Minnesota taxpayers are put to support a battle-
ground for these actions. The Winders case came down in January of 1929, about
three months before the reargument in the Douglas case. Although Wintars is not
cited, that the same policy reason influenced Holmes is indicated by this phrase: "1[I]t
is they [the taxpaying residents] who pay for maintaining the Courts concerned., 279
U.S. at 387. Nearly a year after Douglas, in Boright v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., x8o
Minn. 52, 230 N.W. 457 (1930), Justice Stone, again in dissent, urged the Minnesota
Supreme Court to take advantage of the greater freedom of the Douglas opinion. The
majority, however, considered itself bound by its own pre-Douglas decisions and re-
fused to adopt a more liberal rule.
[Vol. 1 q6x: 42 j
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dictional and venue statutes so and the equitable doctrines of laches and
estoppel.3' The same rule presumably would apply to statutes of
limitation.32
Applying the Mondou-Douglas rule to the ICA, state courts must
enforce rights and duties arising under the act, subject only to the power
of the state to set up restrictions in the interest of maintaining a forum
reasonably accessible to the taxpayers who support it. Thus, for some
purposes the legislature of a state sits in Washington.33
THE SEVERAL TYPES OF PRIVATE ACTIoNs
Having established the duty of state courts to enforce rights and
duties, arising under the ICA, it remains to define the actions which
come within this classification. Briefly stated, there are three bases of
private rights of action associated with the ICA: express rights of action,
judicially created rights of action, and "hybrid" rights of action.
Express rights of action, of little importance in the ICA, are founded
on statutory language providing a private plaintiff with a specific remedy
for a specific wrong 3 4 These rights dearly arise under the ICA and, as
such, must be enforced pursuant to the Mondou-Douglas rules.35
" Herb v. Pitcairn, 324. U.S. 117, 123 (1945); Douglas v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R.,
279 U.S. 377 (1929).
21 Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U.S. 672 (1913). "[W]here the non-federal ground
has fair support, we are not at liberty to inquire whether it is right or wrong, but must
accept it, as we do other state decisions of non-federal questions." Enterprise Irrigation
Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, z64. (1917).
But forum non conveniens was held in Schultz v. Union Pac. R.R., 257 P.zd 1003,
xz8 Cal. App. 2d 169 (1953), to be an insuffient ground for rejection of an FELA
action. A4ccord, Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 259 P.±d 664, (Cal. App. 1953).
Contra, Mooney v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., tx8 Utah 307, 221 P.zd 628 (1950).
Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N.E. 2 (9x16), holds that a state statute which
bars actions under the FELA and similar state action for out-of-state injuries was con-
stitutional because it applied equally to residents and non-residents, federal and state
actions.
:
2 Some express liability sections of the securities acts are internally provided with a
time limitation, but there is no statute of limitations for rights arising under the securi-
ties acts generally. A bill to provide such a statute, H.R. 2788, was favorably reported
out of the House Judiciary Committee but not passed. H.R. Rep. No. 1141, 7 9th Cong.
1st Sess. (1945). 3 Loss 1771 n.297.
:'Cf. 2 Loss 987.
" See 54 Stat. 837 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-2 9 (f) (95s8). This section incor-
porates by reference the well known short swing profits liability of § 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896, x5 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1958), and is the
only express right of action under the ICA.
"3 The parallelism here with the FELA is nearly perfect. In both instances the
rights of action are expressly created by a federal statute concurrently enforceable in
state and federal courts.
Vol. x§62:4'2j]
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Judicially created rights of action are those rights of action which
are not a product of the statutory language itself but which come
about through the application of some doctrine external to the statute.
Principally they have arisen when the courts have applied the tort
"violation of statute" doctrine 8 to provisions in the ICA which merely
declare certain acts unlawful or provide administrative sanctions with-
out expressly allowing private remedies. Whether rights of action
created by the tort doctrine arise under the ICA, and hence are federal
law, or whether they are a product of state law is a question of some
complexity. Generally, when the lower federal courts apply the tort
doctrine to the ICA, they are applying federal common law"1 and the
right of action produced is federal in character.38 When the state
courts apply the tort doctrine to the ICA, then arguably, the state or
federal character of the resulting right turns upon the source of the
doctrine 9 and the mechanics of its application."° It is necessary here
as This doctrine is examined in some detail in the next section. For present pur-
poses it is only necessary to point out that it has been used by some courts to mechani-
cally produce private actions under the ICA and other securities acts.
81Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940); D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC,
315 U.S. 447 (1942); Mater v. Holley, 200 F.zd 123 (Sth Cir. 1952); United States
v. Silliman, 167 F.ad 607, 6zo-at (3 d Cir.), cert. denied, 33 U.S. 8z5 (z948); a
Loss 994 n.si9; 59 HARV. L. REV. 970-72 (1946).
asThere are two methods of analysis here, but under either the same conclusion
obtains. (i) The tort doctrine is completely external to the statute itself; when
applied it creates rights of action by operation of law, just as a fee tail is converted
into a fee simple by statutes in most American states. Under this analysis, the character
of the right of action is ultimately determined by the source of the tort doctrine which
creates it. Since federal common law is being used, the right produced is federal in
character.
(2) Regardless of the method used by the courts in allowing rights of action under
a federal statute, those rights reflect an attempt to give full force and effect to provisions
of the statute. Furthermore, in the absence of the statute there would be no comparable
standard to enforce. Therefore the private right of action arises under the federal
statute and is federal law.
so If the state courts profess to apply federal tort law then the right of action will
be federal in character under analysis (t) or (z) in note 39 supra. If the state
courts apply state tort law, then the character of the action turns upon the considera-
tions developed in note 41 infra.
"'As was seen in note 39 supra, the choice of theory used in the lower federal
courts has no effect on the character of the action. Under either theory, the resulting
private right is federally created.
However, where the private right of action is asserted in a state court, and where
the court uses state tort doctrines, see note 40 supra, then the choice of analysis becomes
critical. Under the first analysis of note 39 supra, the character of the action turns on
the source of the tort doctrine used. Since the state court plaintiff's theory centers on
the state tort doctrine, the right of action is state law. The second analysis in note 39
[Vol. 196a: 411
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only to point out that an unsolved and very conceptualistic problem
exists, the resolution of which is the key to the applicability of the
Mondou-Douglas rule."
Hybrid rights of action arise under Section 47(b) of the ICA.
This section expressly renders certain contracts void with respect to the
rights of persons violating the act. For purposes of actions brought by
an innocent party to avoid such a contract and to seek restoration of the
status quo," it would seem that a right arising under the ICA is asserted,
whether the action is brought in a federal or state court." How-
ever, some federal courts have allowed tort damages under section
sura, would reason that the cause of action should not turn on doctrinaire metaphysics
but rather on more pragmatic considerations. Since these rights arise under a federal
statute they should be considered federal law regardless of the court in which they are
being enforced. Further, such a holding would tend to produce more uniformity of
enforcement through the Supreme Court's power of review.
Professor Loss points out that in any event the state courts could grant causes of
action based on violation of state common law standards analagous to the ICA. These
would clearly be state rights, unreviewable by the Supreme Court. 2 Loss 999.
,' The question has not been spoken to at present by the Supreme Court. At the
time of this writing the Court has accepted certiorari in Brouk v. Managed Funds, 286
F.zd 9ox (8th Cir.), cer. granted, 366 U.S. 958, Motion of Solicitor General for
leave to participate in oral argument granted, 368 U.S. 873 (196z). This action,
however, was brought in a federal district court and thus does not raise the question
of ICA enforcement in a state court.
42 54 Stat. 846 (194o), x5 U.S.C. § goa-46(b) (1958). "Every contract made
in violation of any provision of this title [i.e., the ICA] or of any rule, regulation,
or order thereunder, and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance
of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice
in violation of, any provision of this title, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder,
shall be void (i) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such
provision, rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in the performance of
any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party
to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the
facts by reason of which the making or performance of such contract was in violation
of any such provision, rule, regulation, or orderY"
"'These remedies follow by operation of law whenever a contract is declared void
with respect to the rights of one of the parties to it. 6 CORBIN, CONTRAcTs § 1540
(xg5x) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRAS § 6o (1932). This has long been an established
principle under Blue Sky Laws. Kneeland v. Emerton, z8o Mass. 371, 183 N.E. x55,
87 A.L.R. 1 (1932). In that context, it has been said that the rule applied whether
the statute declared the contract voidable, void, or unlawful.
"' It is plausible to reason in the fashion of the first analysis of note 39 supra, and
conclude that the source of the contract law utilized to allow an action for restitution
should determine the character of the action. However, this is an unduly hairsplitting
approach and reveals the sometime weakness of strict logic in determining legal results.
It is submitted that the actions for restitution and the right to avoid such a contract are
such an integral part of the phraseology of § 4 7 (b) that they should be held to have
the status of federal law.
.rl "1 7 t, yT'7 I['tt lrJ' IA lt IkVrl f t t lJ'rlt '11r 9" D a t --l'
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47(b),4" presumably based upon common law principles. In the lower
federal courts, as in the case of the tort doctrine, these hybrid remedies
are federal in character in that they are produced by federal common
law.46 However, in the state courts, the same conceptualistic problems
are encountered as exist under .the tort doctrine.47
Upon the determination of the federal-state character of these hy-
brid and private rights of action turns the applicability of the Mondou-
.DQuglas rules and .the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review
state court decisions. 8 Ultimately the Supreme Court must decide the
Aissuei until its resolution the state courts are bound only to enforce
the rights of the ICA which are express in character. A determination
*by the Supreme Court that private rights of action are to be granted
-under the act4 would give them the status of express rights of action,
and tender them enforceable in the state courts to the extent required
by.the Mondou-Douglas rule."
AN ANALYsis oF THE TORT "VOLATioN OF STATUTE" DOCTRINE
Express and "hybrid" rights of action under the ICA find their
basis in the language of the act itself. Judicially created rights of
action, on the other hand, rest in most cases on -the application of the
tort "violation of statute" doctrine.50 The traditional development of
the tort doctrine has been in terms of negligence, as is illustrated by two
frequently cited articles by Professors Lowndes and Thayer."
"Kardon v. Natl. Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Penn. 1946); Geismar v.
Bond & Goodwin, 4o F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 194). The reasoning in these cases is
grossly lacking. Judge Coxe in the Geismar case correctly concludes that a right of action
exists under § 4 7 (b) but then goes on to say that damages also may be awarded. The
first proposition is good contract law, note 44 supra, but the second, disposed of in one
sentence and an incorrect case citation [Deckert v. Independence Corp., 311 U.s. 282
(1940), cited at 878], is rather novel if taken at all literally. The court in the
Kardon case passed the question with a citation to Geismar, treating it as "well settled."
" Cf. note 39 supra.
," These problems seem to be more genuine here than under the tort doctrine, for it
is certainly arguable that in approving § 4 7(b), Congress intended to take advantage of
precedents of state contract law and especially the large number of decisions under the
Blue Sky Laws which have interpreted similar provisions. Compare note 45 supra.
" Hart, The Relations between States and Federal Law, s4 COLUM. L. REV. 489,
537 (1954).
" This question may be answered by the Supreme Court in Brouk v. Managed Funds,
Inc., 286 F.2d 9o ( 9 th Cir.), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958, Motion of Solicitor General
for leave to participate in oral argument granted, 368 U.S. 873 (1961).
so See generally RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 286 (1934) ; z HAItPEE & JAMEs, ToRn
§ 17.6 (x956) ; PROSSER, TORTs § 34 (2d ed. 1955).
'xLowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, z6 MINN. L. REv. 361
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Professor Thayer sees the violation of a protective statute as negli-
gdnce per se, i.e., negligence as a matter of law."2 The better view,
however, as propounded by Professor Lowndes, is that violation -of a
statutory standard is but some evidence of negligence, to be considered
by the fact-finder along with other evidence.5" Under either. view, -the
private right of action rests upon negligence, and -is subject to all the
safeguards and defenses inherent in this method of apportioning the
burden of social misconduct.
The federal securities cases, however, have not talked in terms of
negligence. They have seen the doctrine as a black-letter rule which
operates upon those statutes enacted for the protection of a special group
and mechanically generates private rights of action in members of the
group. In Baird v. Franklin,"4 the court said:
The fact that the statute provides no machinery or procedure by which the
individual right of action can proceed is immaterial.5 5  It is Well established
that members of a class for whose protection a statutory duty5" is created may
sue for injuries resulting from its breach and that the common law will sup-
ply a remedy if the statute gives none."
In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,"8 the court, relying on Section 286
of the Restatement of Torts, concluded: "The disregard of the com-
mand of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort."59  In Fischman v. Ray-
theon Mfg. Co.,60 the court said:
(1932); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. RE.- 317 (1914).
"' Thayer first explodes the "duty theory" reasoning used by some courts in these
concise words, which could well be taken to heart in many modern federal securities
cases: "Too often the mere statement of a conclusion that 'the statute creates a duty to
the plaintiff' is used as if it furnished some reasons in its own support. At times it is
coupled with the further assertion that 'the plaintiff therefore has a remedy,' as if this
were something more than an identical proposition." Thayer, supra note 5z, at 318-19.
For an equally incisive expos6 of this type of reasoning, done in a humorous fashion,
see the tale of the totem animal killer in Ross, Tu-Tu, 7o HARV. L. REv. 8i1 (x957).
Thayer then goes on to reach the conclusion mentioned in the text above: "Whenever
due care is the issue, the breach of the statute supplies the legal equivalent of negligence.
The defendant is in no position to meet the test of the prudent man." Thayer, supra
note S2, at 334. But see 2 HARPER & JAMES, ToRtTs 995 (x956).
" Lowndes, supra note 52, at 376.
54 141 F.zd 238 (2d Cir. 1944).
55 Contra, RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 287 (1934).
" But see Thayer's reasoning on the use of the "duty" theory at note 53 supra.
"'Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 1944).
s 69 F. Supp. 51z (E.D. Pa. 1946).
"Id. at 523.do z88 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
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[The Securities Act] does not explicitly authorize a civil remedy. Since,
however, it does make "unlawful" the conduct it describes, it creates such a
remedy.
Nothing the courts say in these decisions indicates that they are
at all cognizant of the contrast between the facts presented in the Baird,
Kardon, and Fischman cases and the factual situations envisioned by
Lowndes, Thayer, and subsequent commentators. The Baird case in-
volved willful and continuous violations of Section 6(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act by the New York Stock Exchange." The Kardon
case concerned a fraudulent conspiracy aimed at inducing the plaintiff
to part with stock at less than its true value. The Fischman case in-
volved losses arising out of fraudulent conduct in the use of a prospectus.
In contrast, the traditional tort doctrine is concerned with the attri-
butes of the reasonable man, the effect that his violation of statute will
have on the negligence question, and the division of function between
judge and jury. 2  It can hardly be said that the stock "churning,""
the excessive fees6 4 the paying of "kick backs," and the other abusesU
which have occurred despite the ICA are products of negligence, of
an unfortunate accident.68
's48 Stat. 88S (1934), is U.s.c. § 78(f)(b) (x958).
"' Professor Lattin says there is no right to a jury in a sharholders' derivative suit
for it is an action in equity. LATrIN, CORPORATIONS 35o (:959). Therefore, no
question of judge and jury function could arise. Some states will allow a jury in an
equity action for special findings of fact. In Delaware, for example, the Court of
Chancery may order a trial of such issues at the bar of the Superior Court. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 1o, § 369 (1953). But such an order is in the discretion of the court.
Saunders v. Saunders, 3 Del. Ch. 514, 71 A.2d 258 (195o).
"' See note 16 supra.
"'Excessive fee structures seem to be the prime point of attack on investment com-
panies by stockholders today. It is often alleged that the management contracts do not
reflect the lower relative cost incurred in the operation of a large fund as compared to
smaller funds. See testimony of William J. Thorold in SEC, REPORT OF INVESTMENT
TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES pt. III, at 2491 (1941). See Comment, t96x
DuxE L.J. 421 n.2. Excessive fee structure was an allegation in Saminsky v. Abbott,
CCH FEn. Sac. L. REP. 91,o4.7 (Del. Ch. Sept. %8, ig6i).
05 SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, pt. III, at
1563-x934, 7566-69, 1874-1934 (1940). See also Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381 (Del.
Ch. 196:) (kickbacks); 3 Loss 1421-1528 (2d ed. 196i) (fraudulent promotional
schemes).
"' This is not to say that there is a complete absence of precedent for the application
of the tort "violation of statute" doctrine to intentional violations of statute. In Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (iqi5), the Supreme Court, construing the
Safety Appliance Act, 27 Stat. 531 (:893), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1958),
said that where the command of a statute is disregarded, there is an implied right of
action. But the argument, as it is expounded by many of the recent securities cases, that
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In reality the tort doctrine is merely a slightly more sophisticated
way of expressing the old half-truth that "for every wrong there is a
remedy." 7  In a dose analysis of judicial lawmaking, Professor
Lowndes concluded that courts in fact have unlimited power to legislate,
but are somewhat self-conscious about exercising such power." The
federal courts have found it far easier to pronounce the availability of a
civil remedy for a plaintiff by relying on the Restatement of Torts,
Prosser, Lowndes, and Thayer, than to appear to be speaking ex
cathedra. Thus, in spite of the illegitimate parentage and doubtful
relevance of the tort doctrine, these courts often have been willing to
forego dose analysis in reliance on its authority. 9 The doctrine really
functions as a crutch, an impressive backdrop against which a bit of
judicial sleight of hand may be indulged in without fear of its identifi-
cation. However, pending recognition of private rights of action by
the Supreme Court, state courts are free to render their own considered
judgment as to the advisability of allowing these actions.
CONCLUSION
By the Mondou-Douglas rule, the Supreme Court has declared that
state court enforcement of concurrently enforcible federal statutes is a
matter of right, and may not be barred save in the interests of rea-
sonable judicial administration.
The extent of the application of the Mondou-Douglas rule, how-
ever, turns on the federal or state character of the specific private right
of action in question. Although choice of theory here is crucial, the
this decision stands for a doctrine which will, automatically and regardless of negligence,
convert any statute enacted for the protection of a special group into a vehicle of civil
liability for the private plaintiff is presumptive in at least two respects. First, the Court
emphasized the implementation of congressional purpose instead of the application of
a black letter rule. Second, the Rigsby case probably was a negligence action even
though the court found the policy of protection so strong that it deemed it unnecessary
to pass on the question. The Court said that § 8 of the act (z7 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. § 7
(1958) in actions brought in reliance on the act, assumption of risk would be no bar)
renders "irresistible" the inference of a private right of action. Id. at 4o. This reason-
ing is sound, for why would Congress modify the substantive rights of a personal injury
plaintiff as it did in § 8, if it did not anticipate the bringing of a personal injury action?
" "A pious cant which adds little to clear thinking . . . is the trite jingle that the
law will suffer no wrong without a remedy. If this means that the law will suffer no
moral wrong without giving a remedy, it is obviously untrue. If it means that the law
will suffer no legal wrong without a remedy this is mere tautology, since the existence
of a legal wrong presupposes a legal remedy." Lowndes, supra note 52, at 364-65.
" Id. at 363.
e9 See note 46 supra.
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method by which the federal or state character of the action is deter-
mined has not been made definite; in some cases equally logical argu-
ments may be made for either result. The real issue seems to be
whether the advantage of uniform enforcement of the ICA through
the Supreme Court's power of review outweighs the Court's reluctance
to be a final arbiter of details of the application of substantive law in
state forums. :" I
The basic question, of course, is whether private rights of action
under the ICA should be recognized at all. The lower federal courts
have not been closely analytical when granting these rights. In essence
they -exist because the courts thought they should exist, even though
Congress did not expressly so provide. It is submitted that state courts,
when considering the granting of private rights of action under the
ICA, should more carefully consider the rationale and the implications
of such judicial legislation than did their federal predecessors. If,
indeed, the existence of private rights of action turns on the propriety
of the application of the tort doctrine, then they should not be granted.
